Hypertext -advanced software for organizing information according to webs of conceptual, rather than symbolic, links -has recently provoked humanists to reconsider post-structuralist semiotic concepts. Debates about the design and uses of hypertext, among both software developers and humanists, reflect a conflict between two problematic views of text: as a medium for social interaction, and as a replication of a cognitive structure. Post-structuralist critical theory (PSCT), in challenging concepts of authorship and univocal meaning, argued that semiotic products were more closely connected to each other than to 'reality' or to their 'original' producers. PSCT's notion of 'intertextuality' captured this hyperactive, social aspect of language products. Theories of social construction of scientific knowledge (SCSK), I argue, have crucially relied upon similar, essentially semiotic concepts such as inscription devices, discourse repertoires and the textualization of heterogeneous resources. As SCSK's practitioners have articulated their programme, they have covertly imported cognitive abilities into ostensibly social processes, creating a kind of theoretical hypertension which surfaces in the similar debates over hypertext. Questions about the status of artificial intelligence, which concerns the capacity of a purely symbolic/syntactic structure -a hyper text -to perform as a social actor, sharply expose the tension between cognitive and social that underlies many of SCSK's key concepts. 
Hypertext as Hyper Text
What makes hypertext hyper text is its multidimensionality and its hyperactivity. 'Hyperspace' is a fictional 'fifth dimension' through which travellers can jump instantaneously across huge distances. Without hyperspace, fictional space travellers must resort to cryogenics or multi-generational space flight to reach the stars. Similarly, without hypertext, ordinary readers must slog through page after page of irrelevant information to reach their destination. Rich linkages within texts mean that the cognitive distance between any two 'points' in the text is small. This feature has a literary analogue in the form of 'interactive' fiction and poetry, in which the reader is able to make choices at certain points which determine where the plot or poem will go next -thus to a limited extent exercising creative power in the composition of the text she or he encounters. 11 Hypertexts are also hyperactive. So-called 'hot' buttons or text create a sense of the immanent presence of other levels and invite the user to jump among them. There is a sense, too, well documented by the designers of hypertext, that the links themselves contain information about semantic structure, and therefore that activating them teaches the user about the conceptual relationships within the text. Emerging from the hyperspace of hypertext, one may find ordinary documents passive, dull, lacking in a certain intelligence. It's a bit like the struggle of writing with a pen after becoming accustomed to a word processor.
Such at least is the hype of hypertext. Every academic knows how to use its index and table of contents to skim a paper book; any child leafing through an encyclopaedia is doing the 'active' reading for which hypertext designers yearn. Still, hypertext makes such a style of reading central, automates its techniques, and creates new ones -like hypermaps and hypermedia -for which printed books have few or no analogues. In the mythology of hypertext, both text and reader are energized, activated, set into a hyperdrive that produces an ultimately political result: 'as long as any reader has the power to enter the system and leave his or her mark, neither the tyranny of the center nor that of the majority can impose itself', writes George Landow.12 Or as Nelson, originator of the term, preached in 1987:
Imagine a new accessibility and excitement that can unseat the video narcosis that now sits on our land like a fog. Imagine a new libertarian literature with alternative explanations so that anyone can choose the pathway or approach that best suits him or her; with ideas accessible and interesting to everyone, so that a new richness and freedom can come to the human experience; imagine a rebirth of literacy. 13 
The Concept of 'Text' in Post-Structuralist Critical Theory
But what exactly is 'text'? We can learn much by turning to literary theory and cultural criticism, where the concept has become increasingly problematic since the 1960s, when the French structuralists, building on the earlier work of Saussure, first explored language as a self-activating field of structured differences rather than a mapping of concepts on to reality.
Clearly, texts -written documents -play a constitutive role in modern societies. They serve not only as vehicles for information but as symbols of authority (like the books on a lawyer's -or an academic's -many bookshelves), as surrogates for the lost presence of the past (for the historian), as tools of persuasion (in politics and advertising), as religious icons (the Bible, the Koran), as metalegal foundations (the Constitution), as rewards and social validations (certificates, diplomas) and as arbiters of objective reality (as contracts stand to prevent disagreements over commitments). Texts are so important that their production is a central rite of passage and professional qualification (tests, theses, dissertations) and an icon of knowledge itself. As Derrida and others have pointed out, ours is a thoroughly logocentric culture. Small wonder, then, that text and knowledge can seem practically identical (especially to academics!), with polished written products both the measure and the medium of learned skill.
Practitioners of science studies may think of critical theory as essentially opposed to their own views. To a large degree its thrust has been to de-emphasize the historical and social conditions of the production of writing, and to promote purely semiotic concepts of text. Science studies, by contrast, has been engaged primarily in re-emphasizing those very conditions and verifying their constitutive influence on the content of knowledge. But I believe that at a deeper level the efforts of these two fields have much more in common than they realize. In the following pages I want to explore what happens when we apply the insights of poststructuralist critical theories (hereafter abbreviated PSCT) of texts and their production to scientific writing and discourse. First I will review some of the key concepts and methods of the poststructuralists. Then I will explore some of the parallels in the science studies literature.
Barthes: Text versus Work
In the 1960s, Roland Barthes declared an important difference between the emerging concept of 'text' and the traditional idea of the 'work', where 'works' are documents in the traditional sense, fixed in time and space and dependent for their meaning on the intentions and creative powers of their authors. 'Texts', in his view, were constituted in an interconnected field of crossreferencing, differential structures of language, dependent for their meaning on other texts, and detached from personality and intention.
While the work is held in the hand, the text is held in language: it exists only as discourse. ... [ In other words, texts rely for their functioning on a not-so-implicit background of other texts -what Barthes once called 'writing degree zero' -just as words depend for their meaning on the background of other words against which they are defined. All writers are of necessity also readers, and each writer gathers the concepts, narratives, metaphors and other resources that inform his or her writing from the works of other authors and the play of language that surrounds him or her. In this sense no writer writes alone; text is fundamentally a social and interactive category. The boundaries between texts are fuzzy at best, and serve primarily social functions; to the degree that they are meaningful all texts are nodes in an intertextual field:
Every text, being itself the intertext of another text, belongs to the intertextual, which must not be confused with a text's origins; to search for the 'sources of and 'influence upon' a work is to satisfy the myth of filiation.'5 Indeed, sense-making in general, and literary criticism in particular, are possible only because of this intensive and multi-levelled cross-referencing, this reliance on the common field of language.
Foucault: The Idea of an 'Author'
Similarly, the notion of an 'author' was challenged by such thinkers as Barthes, Foucault and Derrida. Foucault, above all, attempted to problematize such apparently natural categories as the book and the author. The argument was that while such categories provide convenient anchor points for intellectual history, taking them for granted may conceal certain kinds of social, historical and significative processes. Foucault pointed out that the social role of the 'author-function' varies over time. For example, written texts have at times been subject to 'penal appropriation' (censorship; the punishment of authors and/or owners) to identify and punish subversion. In Foucault's important essay 'What Is An Author?',16 after pointing to the various ways 'authors' are constructed in discourse -as authorities, as the owners of copyrights, as subjective centres from which a number of texts emanate and to which explanations of textual characteristics are to be directed -he pointed out that 'we can easily imagine a culture where discourse would circulate without any need for an author',17 in the sense that the social role and significance ascribed to authorship would not exist.18
The question of the relation between an author and a text is thus, precisely, an issue of authority. Since readers and social institutions are active in the production of meaning, it remains an open socio-historical question how the meaning and the use of a text will be determined, and by whom.
For these writers and their intellectual descendants, 'text' ceased to be an unproblematic expression of subjectivity, a transparent report of internal events or an 'objective' account of reality. It became instead a primary operator in the construction of subjectivities, authors, events, even of truth itself. For Foucault, writing was one of an array of disciplinary technologies through which people are transformed from objects into subjects.19 He spoke of texts as producing 'truth effects' -truth as a product of narrative strategies and deployments of resources rather than of correspondence with reality. His notion of 'power/knowledge' expressed what he saw as an intrinsic link between social control and the production and control of representations. Text became 'decentred', revolving no longer around the central figure of the author's 'authority' (that is, his or her intentions) but instead fragmented among multiple authors and readers (not just individuals, but also the multiple identities and levels of consciousness that exist within and between individuals) and cultures. Rather than defer to the author's 'authority', this understanding of textual activity emphasized the social flow of significance and the shared background of language as texts moved between readers and writers. Thus Foucault could write that 'rather than speaking language we are spoken by it'. This is to say that subjectivity, like textuality, is constituted largely in language and therefore partially governed by 'virtual structures',26 environments and contexts that are the condition of meaningfulness of individual language. We rely on narratives, stories, fables and tales for our sense of location within the immense structure of differences our language -and our representational culture -weave around us.
Derrida: Truth and Authority

Bolter and Literary Hypertexts
Bolter, in Writing Space: The Computer, Hypertext and the History of Writing,27 points out that post-structuralism and deconstruction are oppositional forms in literary theory and philosophy. They are predicated on the historical presumption of the primacy of printed texts, which seem to fix the text in space and time and enable its defence against such 'externalities' as criticism, satires, passing references and marginal notes. Deconstruction sets out to challenge this primacy by demonstrating the availability within any given work of methods and concepts that contradict and transcend it. A key notion is that of the palimpsest, the parchment of medieval scribes whose original writing was rubbed out again and again for reuse. Like palimpsests, texts, for the deconstructionist, contain the dim but still legible traces of other texts from whose resources they are built. Layers of meaning may be peeled away, always revealing other layers beneath them.
The notion of 'intertextuality' names the necessary reliance of any given text on many others for the construction of its meaning. The contemporary backlash against deconstruction and other forms of PscT -entwined as it is with the defence of the 'canon' of Western culture against popular culture and new academic multiculturalist agendas -is an attempt to reassert the power of 'authority' in many forms: the 'common sense' of the importance of the author's intention, the primacy of the original text and the difference between high and low culture. 28 Bolter's idea -like that of many proponents -is that hypertext, as a new medium, does not make the same imperialistic claims on a reader's understanding as the more rigid printed text.29 First by presuming multiple readings, without privileging any one, and then by allowing the reader/user to overlay connections and commentary on the original in a form that gives equal authority to the additions, hypertext is the perfect palimpsest, piling up meanings and associations in potentially endless rewritings. Hypertext is self-deconstructive writing.
As I noted above, this reading of hypertext has an essentially political character centred around a Foucauldian notion of authority. 'Hypertext', as Nielsen puts it, basically destroys the authority of the author to determine how readers should be introduced to a topic. . . . Authoring takes on an entirely new dimension when your job is changed to one of providing opportunities for readers rather than ordering them around. 30 Bolter argues that 'electronic writing . opposes standardization and unification as well as hierarchy' ;31 Landow, following parallels to PSCT similar to Bolter's, goes so far as to claim that hypertext .. . thrives on marginality ... in part because hypertext does not only redefine the central by refusing to grant centrality to anything, to any lexia ....
[The] hypertextual dissolution of centrality, which makes the medium such a potentially democratic one, also makes it a model of a society of conversations in which no one conversation, no one discipline or ideology, dominates or founds the others. 32 The utopian character of such pronouncements is predicated upon hypertext proponents' own construction of subjectivity -that is to say, of readers both interested in, and capable of constantly choosing among, many alternative paths. This view, we should note here, is prima facie problematic. Lamb concludes that hypertext readers face issues of 'attenuation of attention', while Pea argues that hypertext can generate a state of 'cognitive entropy' where 'users forget what they were supposed to be doing, are confused as to which links they did or didn't follow, etc'.33
Discourse and Text
Bolter, like most post-structuralists and deconstructionists, concentrates primarily on literary texts, a location where multivocality and multivalency of meaning may be, if not taken for granted, at least expected and respected. But their arguments need notindeed, must not, if they are to be taken seriously -be so narrowly focused. One of Derrida's most important efforts, for example, has been to break down the basis for the philosophical priority of the spoken word as closer to truth and speaker's meaning than the written sign. He demonstrates convincingly that the deep structure of written and spoken signs is the same and that, in fact, writing (with its inherent formal difference and temporal deferral from a non-existent 'original' thought or meaning) is that structure.34 Thus for Derrida both written and spoken language operate within the same field of textuality.
The most significant way of operationalizing this concept has been through the notion of 'discourse'. This term has diverse origins in critical theory, sociology and linguistics. It was introduced perhaps most significantly by Foucault,35 but has also been employed by 'discourse analysis' and other methods.36 Some schools use a narrow definition in which 'discourse' refers only to speech and conversation, but in general 'discourse' names the whole field of signifying practices, including not only speech and writing but many other 'forms of life' whose effect is the production of meaning. 37 Bolter's insight is that intertextuality is really the same thing as hyper textuality -active text, with its inherent potential for generating new meaning actuated by juxtapositions, repetitions, incorporations, attacks, defences, citation, invocations and so on. This may make it sound as if texts interact on their own, without readers, writers, needs, interests or purposes (and this has, in fact, been a perennial criticism of PSCT). But actually this decentring of the subject, in the sense of a unified and originary consciousness, and the attempt to understand the textual field as operating without a subject,38 is (as I have already noted) part of the point. Like hypertext, PSCT describes meaning as primarily constituted in the linkages between words, symbols, social institutions and texts. Like many positions in recent social studies of science, PSCT sidesteps psychological theory by describing the generation of meaning as taking place in the interactions of representations with each other. And also like social studies of science, which oppose traditional conceptions of scientific method, individual genius and cognitive objectivity, post-structuralism is a revolt against the canonization of texts and the vesting of authority in a special and particular subjectivity.
Critical Theory and Social Studies of Science: Recovering Multivalence and Plurivocity in Science
Part of the difficulty of interpretive science studies stems, notoriously, from the fact that scientific texts and language have been conventionally interpreted as one end of a continuum that runs from precise univocity to poetic polysemy and plurivocity. This is especially true for the formal languages deployed by science, such as mathematics, biological classification and computer languages. Both cultural stereotypes and claims made by many scientists cleave to the view that scientific texts have a single meaning, or at most a narrow range of meanings within a well-defined field. The univocity of these meanings is tied to their presumed correspondence relationship with an exterior reality, rather than to the intent of their authors.
Social studies of science -in particular the branch of it associated with the social constructivist 'strong programme' in sociology of scientific knowledge -has done a good deal in the last fifteen years to undermine these assumptions. (This discussion is aimed primarily at constructivist science studies, so hereafter I will use the abbreviation scsK -following Ronald Giere39 -for 'social construction of scientific knowledge'.) But few social theorists have taken up the conceptual resources of PSCT in the process. One reason for this may be the widespread perception that Pscr reduces everything to problems of language and semiotics, while SCSK has been at pains to discover and assert the relations between the practices of science and its representational products. Yet this view of both PSCT and scsK is only partially correct, and there are clear parallels between PSCT and many versions of scsK.
A number of the current theories and methods in social studies of science have been organized (tacitly or explicitly) around theories of scientific language, in the form of both written texts and laboratory discourse. Sociology, history and anthropology of science have attempted to recover a broader sense of the multiple possibilities inherent even in scientific language. Analysts -myself included -have done this by focusing on scientific representational practices,40 by emphasizing the social construction of texts and meanings,41 by interrogating the role of metaphor in scientific discourse,42 and through the various incarnations of the notion of 'paradigm shift', by which a single term may be seen as having multiple meanings for different research communities and for the same community at different times.43 Social constructivist science studies tend to focus on scientific controversies, rather than 'settled' theories, because these are held to reveal processes of construction which get suppressed once a candidate theory (or inscription device, or technological form) has achieved dominance. The fact that seemingly settled theories, such as physics before Einstein, have occasionally been reopened, and the fact that anomalies and competing theories always exist, are together claimed to constitute evidence that controversies could erupt anew at any time, given the right conditions. Attention thus focuses on those moments when existing representational forms lose their stability, revealing multivalency and contingency and opening a space for new voices. Social energies must be continually expended to suppress potential controversies and maintain the stability of accepted theories.
The strong-programme and discourse-analysis schools of scsK have often appealed to the so-called 'symmetry' principle, under which scientific error may not be explained by social factors unless the production of scientific truth is also explained in this way. 44 This move, foundational for scsK, can be seen as an attempt to bracket the representational character of language, since it implies that whatever is 'out there' cannot cause the production of representations directly. Such an analysis thinks of representations as social products and sees their production and exchange as part of a process of action, negotiation and power relations.
Having thus dispensed with the objectivist view of scientific language, SCSK proceeds to dismantle the possibility of a subjectivist alternative (in which language might be seen as referring to internal states of speakers) by insisting on the primacy of the social. When a conceptual justification is offered, it often takes the form of a Wittgensteinian neo-behaviourism,45 emphasizing the inherently public nature of linguistic meaning, and/or a Habermasian ideal-speech scenario which points to the underdetermination of theory by evidence to foreground the priority of communication over individual belief, perception or intent. 46 Together, these positions lead SCSK toward a view of language that looks a lot like the PSCT notion of intertextuality. Indeed, as in the case of the critical theorists, the relativist sociologists are acutely aware of the hyperactivity of their own texts. Many now adopt a reflexive approach -an attempt to make their own views self-deconstructing -either at the programmatic level or, in a (sometimes) interesting 'embedded' approach, through using socalled 'new literary forms',47 that -like hypertext -make the text explicitly multivocal.
Non-constructivist areas of social studies of science have also sometimes used a textual approach. Citation analysis, for example, is essentially a reading of the construction of authority through and within texts.
These various currents in SCSK are directed at revealing the enormous investments required to stabilize scientific texts -to keep them from going, as it were, hyper -and the ever-present possibilities of destabilization, 'revolution' and reinterpretation of both theories and data.
Latour and His Colleagues
One of the chief methods of achieving this end is the recovery of the full range of linguistic and representational practices of scientists. For example, one of the key analytical concepts of Latour and Woolgar's pioneering study of laboratory culture, Laboratory Life, was that of 'inscription devices' -laboratory instruments as machines for the production of marks, such as graphs and other writing, and thus for the textualization of theory.48 They suggest that the ability to multiply inscriptions by reifying theory in inscriptive instruments is one of the major ways in which scientists accumulate support for their position. Another concept was the alteration in status of knowledge claims via the insertion and deletion of modals into sentences in conversations, memos and laboratory publications. Latour's more recent Science in Action suggests that the method and the goal of scsK should be to illustrate the social and linguistic processes of construction of the 'textbook sentences' that constitute finished, stable scientific facts and theories.
[W]e start with a textbook sentence which is devoid of any trace of fabrication, construction or ownership; we then put it in quotation marks, . .. place it in the mouth of someone who speaks; then we add to this speaking character another character to whom it is speaking; then we place all of them in a specific situation . .; then . . . situations, localisations, even people start being slowly erased; . . .[finally] we see a new sentence, without any quotation marks, written in a textbook similar to the one we started with. 49 Latour is talking about the stabilization of scientific theories in terms of the accumulation and use of power. But the mechanisms of power he describes bear more than a passing resemblance to those involved in the stabilization of interpretations of any other kind of text. They involve the multiplication of confirming statements (both written and spoken) and of other kinds of inscriptions which form an intertextual network of support with the 'textbook' theory. And perhaps most importantly, they involve the eventual erasure of social context and action from the representations they have produced, just as the deconstructionists note the creation of a non-social, independent, authorizing 'author' through effects of language in literature.
To take another example, in his celebrated article 'Give Me a Laboratory and I Will Raise the World', Latour points out that the political aspects of science are to be sought in its ability to generate and represent (in both senses) new sources of power: The most recent incarnation of Latourian scsK, socio-technical analysis, is even more striking in this respect.5s Latour and his colleagues advocate an inscription device of their own: sociotechnical graphs, a graphical/textual representation of the course of a scientific or technological development, implemented in Hypercard software (precisely because of its hypertext capabilities). They invoke the resources of structural linguistics (the paradigm/syntagm distinction) and note that theirs is a mapping technique which 'will never be more than a re-representation in graphic form of an already existing text',52 namely the set of narratives and documents about the case produced by actors, actants and other interested parties such as historians. Sociotechnical graphs implemented as hypertexts provide a means of holding together in a single graphical/textual space a wide range of accounts, including conflicting and divergent narratives as well as complementary ones. Latour and his colleagues are explicit on this point:
Texts oblige one to choose between the detailed narrative and its simplified and abstracted version, whereas hypertexts allow one to circulate very fast between an abstracted version and the detailed narrative from which it originates. Thus the bare outline that follows will appear abstract, since the actants will be reduced to numbers, but if the readers can 'click' on each of those numbers transformed into 'buttons', they will get back to the narrative, and will get a more concrete feeling for what we are after.53
The entire method concerns itself primarily with mapping the changes in definition, meaning and power of 'actants'. The importance of the concept of an 'actant', which flattens the difference between actors (possessed of reasons and intentionality) and artefacts (which may 'act', but without purposes of their own), is that cognitive abilities and private motives are deprived of causal efficacy in favour of a concept of power as derived from the accumulation of supporting linkages.
What is perhaps ironic here is that while Latour and his colleagues seem to be arguing for the reinstatement of nonlinguistic categories, the central concern with the production of statements and accounts makes all such categories meaningful only insofar as they participate in that production. Constructivism is always, ultimately, about the construction of meanings and therefore a matter of semiotic and textual practice, a point largely acknowledged in the most recent work of the Latourian school. The reason, according to Law, is that texts perform two key functions. The first source of textual power is the ability of written documents to act at a distance from the laboratory. Because they are so easily copied and transported, texts can disseminate the laboratory's influence almost anywhere, and can multiply its effects by the number of people and places they reach. Empirical findings, disseminated through papers both published and otherwise distributed, project the laboratory's power by creating 'obligatory passage points' through which future researchers must pass in creating new knowledge. Thus the more widely the text ranges, the more power the laboratory collects.
Second, and most important, texts homogenize heterogeneous resources. Inscriptions are, for actor-network theory, a way of reducing a wide array of forces and objects to a single, twodimensional form that makes them comparable and interconvertible -the money of science, as it were. The power of science stems in large part from its ability to gather and orient an especially wide range of resources in the same direction, constructing stable, solid Thus it is precisely because of its ability to bring objects, forces and agents into the semiotic web of representation that the text plays such an important role.
Actor-network theory 'assumes that there is no overall structure -that there is always a multiplicity of actor-networks each trying to impose its own structure on potentially unreliable entities and thereby borrow their forces and treat them as its own'.57 In this respect its theory of the construction of meaning is similar to PscT's notion of deconstruction, which emphasizes the volatility of the meaning of an apparently stable text because of its constant interaction with other texts. Once again, the notion of socially constructed meanings, ungrounded in a transcendent reality and constantly shifting in a field of semiotic forces, is central. Shapin and Schaffer argue that Boyle's key achievement was to construct a special kind of social 'space', namely the laboratory. Laboratories were a physical location where special apparatus such as Boyle's air-pump was kept, but they were also a 'disciplined'62 arena into which only men of particular qualifications and acceptable behaviour were admitted. Within this space, the critical activity was the 'multiplication of the witnessing experience'.63 By both tacit and explicit agreement, Boyle and his colleagues determined that whenever a number of qualified witnesses concurred in their observations, a matter of fact could be said to be known with a very high degree of probability. These consensual 'facts' would form the basis of the new experimental science. Boyle also sought to maintain a rigorous separation between the 'matters of fact' thus established and their causal explanation. In these and other ways, he thus set up a Wittgensteinian language game in which apparatuses, experiences, social status, practices and language played very particular, intricately interwoven roles. To engage in this language game was to gain a privileged form of access to reality. 
Gilbert and Mulkay
Pinch and Bijker
Pinch and Bijker, in their influential programmatic essay on social construction of technology, argue that technology, like science, may be understood as determined in the last instance by social consensus. They picture constructivist science studies as typically proceeding through three stages: (1) demonstration of the 'interpretative flexibility of scientific findings'; (2) description of social mechanisms that limit this flexibility and 'thus allow scientific controversies to be terminated', which they call 'closure mechanisms'; and (3) relation of these closure mechanisms to a wider social, political and cultural environment. 71 In their own case study of the development of the bicycle, Pinch and Bijker proceed according to this plan. Having established the variety of 'interpretations' of the bicycle's form and function (focusing variously on considerations of safety, macho display, speed, smoothness of ride and so on), they then seek to identify the closure mechanisms which ended the proliferation of forms and led to a relatively small and stable set of bicycle designs. What they say about this is instructive: Closure in technology involves the stabilization of an artifact and the 'disappearance' of problems. To close a technological 'controversy', one need not solve the problems in the common sense of that word. The key point is whether the relevant social groups see the problem as being solved.72
So one major mechanism of closure is purely semiotic. Another, which they call 'closure by redefinition of the problem', is also essentially a semiotic move. Rather than proceeding, as traditional views might understand it, by confronting a problem defined by empirical conditions with various technical solutions until one 'solves' the problem, social groups essentially begin with technical devices and seek a way of representing problems in which these devices can function as their solutions. In the case of the bicycle, 'the meaning of the air tire was translated to constitute a solution to quite another problem: the problem of how to go as fast as possible'. It is significant that these are the only closure mechanisms Structuralism also drew heavily on cybernetics, and Pscr picked up some of the same tropes and epistemology along the way. The reason this (mostly) unacknowledged debt matters here is that the tropes of cybernetics were constitutively dependent on a behaviourist psychology, a point explicitly mentioned in many of the early articles on cybernetics,83 but soon dropped from discussion as it became 'common sense' -another move in the discursive construction of cybernetics. Behaviourism, it will be remembered, is essentially a methodological commitment to explanations in terms of observable behaviour. Behaviourism distrusted or even denied the existence of cognitive (mental) events, attempting to define all activity as responses (R), more or less complex, to environmental stimuli (S), such that R = f(S).84 PSCT and SCSK, as post-cybernetic interdisciplines, have frequently followed its strategy of systematically avoiding cognitive categories.
This lack -which not infrequently extends to deliberate repudiation85 -of any explicit cognitive theory has been a source of tension in both fields. On the one hand, PCST and SCSK both make powerful appeals to a trans-individual level of knowledge production under the rubric of such terms as 'intertextuality', 'intersubjectivity', 'discourse', 'collectivity', 'actor-networks' and 'social epistemology'. The use of 'text' and 'discourse' (as opposed to, say, 'representation' and 'conversation') as primary categories in PSCT, for example, focuses discussion solely on these entities as external, visible products. In scsK, the phrase 'social construction' has become a kind of shorthand or slogan to invoke this apparatus, conceived in opposition to traditional history and sociology of science (which give prominent, indeed dominant, roles to psychological factors).
On the other hand, even if they deny agency in the sense of conscious intentionality, PCST and SCSK both view individuals at least as active nodes in social exchanges. Therefore they also relyimplicitly and explicitly -on individuals somehow to produce the discourse which makes up socially constructed knowledge. The mechanisms of this production usually consist, it may be inferred, of vaguely defined socialization processes in which rewards, sanctions or other forms of feedback produce conformity and consensus. When explicit, they are often unabashedly behaviourist, appealing to the primacy of 'conditioning' and training over explanation and reason. 86 But to pursue power (Latour), individual scientists must be able to recognize which strategies, alliances and so on, will and will not be likely to produce more of it.87 To know which repertoire of discourse to produce at a given moment (Gilbert & Mulkay), scientists must be able to differentiate among the contexts in which each is appropriate. To achieve closure by redefining a problem (Pinch & Bijker), innovators must understand what can and cannot count as 'problems' and 'solutions'. To mobilize a metaphor or narrative structure (Haraway, Dear), scientists must be able to comprehend and manipulate it in recognizable, sensemaking ways.
In fact, the ability to mobilize almost any of the kinds of resources usually cited (networks, inscription devices and so on) for any of the purposes usually mentioned or presumed (power, recognition, knowledge and the like) requires individuals to possess extremely complex skills of recognition, interpretation and response. The abilities to read, write, speak, understand, recognize patterns and plan for the future have, for the last thirty years, been generally recognized by cognitive psychologists to involve extraordinarily complex internal processes and innate abilities not reducible by any stretch of the imagination to behaviourist 'conditioning'.88 Like PSCT, SCSK usually prefers simply to ignore the literature in this area.
This strategy succeeds only because SCSK covertly imports cognitive abilities into its ostensibly 'social' theories in the form of unexamined assumptions. Scientists are simply presumed to be able to recognize, interpret and respond in the relevant ways, the implications of this (for example, that if cognitive abilities allow them to differentiate valuable from useless resources, individuals might also -by themselves, in their private minds -be capable of imagining new theories, reasoning to conclusions, creating complex long-term strategies for the deployment of resources and so on) being left unexplored because they are insufficiently 'social' in nature.89 Another, less common, option is to claim that psychological science itself is socially constructed -an idea which, whether true or false, merely begs the questions I have just mentioned. 90 My point here is not that cognitive science is somehow immune to an SCSK interpretation. Certainly it is not. My own book on postWorld War II discourses about minds, machines and subjectivity uses a number of SCSK tools in a historical analysis of the interrelations among computer science, cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence and the US military. Nor do I think cognitive science itself offers some sort of solution to SCSK'S problems. I believe, in fact, that cognitive science's implicit metaphors, political commitments and its own covert importation of social terms renders it, despite its mass and sophistication, theoretically rather thin. Nor, finally, do I seek to 'ground' social studies of science in psychological theories. I think a theory of the cognitive and the social as interpenetrating categories is, in the end, most likely to succeed.91 Of course, many in SCSK have precisely such a goal 'in mind' -as it were.
Instead, I am saying that social constructivism cannot do without some psychological theory, because it must somehow account for the bare ability of individuals to play the roles it discerns them as serving. It has such a theory now, and it is an unsubtle behaviourism. This is exceedingly convenient, for it allows the constructivist simply to dismiss claims, for example, of important discoveries by isolated individuals, attributions of genius or any other basic mechanisms of traditional history and sociology of science which rely on individual capacities. Just as the behaviourists dismissed introspectionism and consciousness itself as unverifiable if observable, unobservable anyway and (therefore?) non-existent to boot, SCSK not only marks such concepts out of bounds on its intellectual map, but declares them with that very stroke nulle part. The behaviourists' rigid commitment to methodological principles -including powerful community-wide taboos against the very mention of internal processes -meant that their experiments ultimately revealed at least as much about the experimenters and their artefacts as about their rats and pigeons.92 scsK's equally rigid commitments to very similar principles are unlikely to fare much better.
SCSK has wholeheartedly embraced a reflexivity involving application of its techniques and premises to its own analyses. It has yet to engage the more radically reflexive question of what its analysts' ability to produce any analyses whatsoever might imply.
The analysis I have just given might be viewed as a critique. If it were, at this point I would be expected to say that this consistent lack of a sophisticated psychological theory, combined with the covert importation of cognitive abilities, makes a thoroughgoing 'social epistemology' -and consequently social constructivism itself -unlikely to hold much water. And of course these points have been part of a long-standing debate about the relationship of the cognitive to the social, carried on in part in the pages of Social Studies of Science. 93 But here I want to take a rather different tack instead, relying on an assumption of my own: that tension in theories, as in politics, is a creative force. Following the PscT strategies I have invoked, we may see theories -including SCSK theories -as articulated within an intertextual field wherein they derive much of their meaning from what they oppose and thus, in a sense, confirm the importance of what they deny. I propose to retain and investigate the tension between explicitly social theories and implicit cognitive underpinnings, rather than take it as an opportunity for condemnation of one side or the other. Let us call this dissonance, facetiously, 'hypertension', and let it also name the fact that explicitly cognitive theories import implicit social terms in exactly the same way.94 This term is the one which finally braids up the three strands of this paper, since hypertension brings the hyper texts of PCST and SCSK back to hypertext itself. Two central arguments are usually made for the superiority of hypertext over print media.
Mirror of
The first is that with its rich linkages and associations of information, hypertext better reflects the fact that human knowledge has not only content but inherent structure -multiple, overlapping levels and kinds of structure (associative, temporal, logical, narrative and so on). While this structure may be complex, it is definable (and public). Hypertext can capture it and make it explicit.96 On this view, hypertexts better serve the many specific purposes that require direct access to these frameworks.97 For example, a highly associative system makes it easier to locate information about which one does not know enough to be specific (like the problem of finding a word in a dictionary when one knows the concept one wants to express but does not already know the word). Furthermore, the structural information contained in the links is actuated and presumably learned by the user as he or she explores the hypertext. So, as a tool of communication and reference, hypertext is assumed to better reflect the 'actual' structure of knowledge.
Under this scheme, hypertext rests on a relatively traditional universalist, empiricist epistemology: it is a better 'mirror of nature',98 that is, of the nature of the semantic networks that comprise human knowledge. 'Hypertext nodes can be thought of as representing single concepts or ideas, internode links as representing the semantic interdependencies among these ideas, and the process of building a hypertext network as a kind of informal knowledge engineering'.99 These networks remain stable because they reflect external reality, and hypertext's advantage is that it can better capture the rich structural features of this edifice than linear text: '[h]ypertext makes the deep structure of a knowledge domain explicit'.100 The problem with traditional media, as vehicles for learning, is that their linear presentations provide too little access to the structural level of knowledge -seen as external, empirical and universal, just as it is seen by the builders of expert systems in artificial intelligence.101 At its limit, this perspective sees hypertext as the social vehicle of an enlightened cognitive order.
Appearing alongside this view, often simultaneously, is the second argument: that hypertext is superior to written documents because of its malleability. On this view, each user will find a unique path through the text since it does not enforce a predefined structure. Each will also create and modify hypertexts to reflect his or her own cognitive framework; the semantic structure of shared knowledge is far too weak to match the wide range of individual cognitive organizing principles. 
Semiotic Structures as Social Actors
The vigorous and largely negative response to Slezak's claim about AI (eight responses were published with his original article, and many more in subsequent issues of the journal) exhibits hypertension in action. The SCSK community clearly experienced the challenge of AI as a cognitive theory of scientific discovery as worrisome, and also as an occasion to reinforce its boundaries through articulating its opposition to cognitivism. Yet most of the criticisms, overly focused on Slezak's (incorrect) assertions about the abilities of the AI theorizing program, avoided the really central issues Slezak's essay raised. These concerned the capacity of a purely symbolic/syntactic structure -a hyper text -to perform as a social actor.
In the context of hyper text, the issue is not whether an artificial intelligence program can duplicate events in the mind of a scientist and thereby prove a cognitive theory of scientific discovery, but what if anything differentiates it in principle from the other producers of texts which count as scientific discoveries. Simon, for example, in a claim typical of the AI perspective, holds that 'a mind ... contains meanings, if it contains them, only in the form of patterns of neural structures and processes, that is, as symbols'.116 Since programs also contain and process symbols -texts -the AI view is that a priori distinctions between programs and minds, as generators and processors of text, are meaningless, mystifying and unworkable. This view bears a remarkable similarity to notions of 'actants' in SCSK.
The work of hypertension is clearly visible here. SCSK is caught between its avowed, behaviouristic emphasis on observables -the production and exchange of texts, discourses and so on as the work of science; its social epistemology; the black-boxing of internal processes; the variable attribution of motives and intentions -and the essentialism of its unacknowledged cognitive theories, which still retain a special place for human actors. If science really is socially constructed, nothing prevents it from admitting nonhuman actors into that process on any basis scientific communities can agree on. Thus what would matter about AI is not whether it captures what goes on inside a scientist's mind, but what conditions are imposed upon the circulation of the texts it produces: whether scientists grant it 'authority', in the extended sense of Foucault, when it is operating as an author of texts.
An AI is the ultimate inscription device -self-powered, capable of interesting mistakes, capable of inferences and reformulations of its own rules, capable of communicating, more or less, in natural language with humans. AI (and, possibly, other kinds of computer programs) thus holds a special place on the border between instrumentation and the discursive activities of human scientists. AI texts are hyper texts in the sense that they play with the issue of the voice in the text, as all hypertexts (and all texts) do. A hypertext seems to be cut loose from its author; it seems to create itself as text and so to assert its own voice even more forcefully than texts in previous technologies.117
If the textual aspects of SCSK theory are correct, AI 
